Today's cyber-physical systems face various impediments to achieving their intended goals, namely, communication uncertainties and faults, relative to the increased integration of networked and wireless devices, hinder the synchronism needed to meet real-time deadlines. Moreover, being critical, these systems are also exposed to significant security threats. This threat combination increases the risk of physical damage. This paper addresses these problems by studying how to build the first real-time Byzantine reliable broadcast protocol (RTBRB) tolerating network uncertainties, faults, and attacks. Previous literature describes either real-time reliable broadcast protocols, or asynchronous (non real-time) Byzantine ones. We first prove that it is impossible to implement RTBRB using traditional distributed computing paradigms, e.g., where the error/failure detection mechanisms of processes are decoupled from the broadcast algorithm itself, even with the help of the most powerful failure detectors. We circumvent this impossibility by proposing RT-ByzCast, an algorithm based on aggregating digital signatures in a sliding time-window and on empowering processes with self-crashing capabilities to mask and bound losses. We show that RT-ByzCast (i) operates in real-time by proving that messages broadcast by correct processes are delivered within a known bounded delay, and (ii) is reliable by demonstrating that correct processes using our algorithm crash themselves with a negligible probability, even with message loss rates as high as 60 percent.
INTRODUCTION
M ANY of today's physical structures are governed by automated operations that are typically conducted and controlled by multiple sensing, computing, and communication devices. Generally, such physical structures including their distributed control are known as cyber-physical systems (CPS) [1] . In this paper, we address two problems relevant to modern CPS, found for example in large continuous process plants, manufacturing shop-floors, or power grid installations.
The increasing integration of sensors and actuators, networked and often wireless [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , as well as their scale, introduce uncertainties and faults in communication, which hamper the necessary synchronism to meet real-time deadlines, fundamental for various CPS applications [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] .
Worse, most of those processes are in essence critical infrastructures. Hence, they are likely to be targeted by motivated attackers [7] , [8] , to impact the timeliness of communications-for example by maliciously worsening the impact of the above mentioned uncertainties and faultsand the sheer correctness of messages. These two facets create a completely new scenario, where the traditional approach to building real-time communication no longer works. The consequences of system failure can range from loss of availability to physical damage.
In this paper, we simultaneously address the three threats-uncertainty, faults, and attacks-introducing RT-ByzCast, to the best of our knowledge the first Byzantineresilient real-time reliable broadcast protocol. Previous literature on fault-tolerance contains either real-time reliable broadcast protocols [2] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , or asynchronous (non real-time) Byzantine ones [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . On the one hand, real-time reliable broadcast protocols cannot tolerate attacks: such algorithms would fail, even if a single process is compromised. Using naive platform restarts or cryptography alone is insufficient, and hence does not solve the problem [18] , [19] . On the other hand, existing asynchronous Byzantine solutions do not support real-time. Yet, critical CPS applications must have information disseminated correctly, reliably and in real-time, e.g., as in power system control applications that need to open and close multiple distributed circuit breakers based on thresholds and sensor data [20] .
We approach the aforementioned threats first by formally specifying the needed broadcast properties via an abstraction, which we call Real-Time Byzantine Reliable Broadcast (RTBRB). We then prove that in systems where processes can be Byzantine and communication can simultaneously fail, it is impossible to implement the RTBRB abstraction using traditional distributed computing assumptions and techniques, e.g., where the error/failure detection mechanisms of processes are oblivious of the broadcast algorithm. We also prove that this holds even with the help of sophisticated failure detectors that perfectly reveal the identities of all faulty and untimely processes.
We propose an algorithm, which we call RT-ByzCast, which can cope with transient timing violations and uncertainties while still providing a reliable end result in realtime. We specifically prove that our algorithm indeed implements all properties of the RTBRB abstraction. The main idea underlying our RT-ByzCast algorithm is the use of a temporal and spatial diffusion mechanism of signed messages over a sliding time-window. This diffusion mechanism is augmented with a scheme to aggregate signatures corresponding to those messages. Hence, the time-window constitutes a slack. During that slack, the aggregation and diffusion mechanism tries to mask unanticipated violations, e.g., those caused by communication losses, by having processes repeatedly aggregate signatures relative to the same message and disseminate that message again (temporal diffusion) and to other processes (spatial diffusion).
In order to ensure safety, when losses cannot be masked in time using our aggregation and diffusion scheme, our algorithm triggers processes suffering such losses to crash themselves. Doing so, RT-ByzCast bounds the amount of time a correct process can lose communication with a quorum of the network. This self-crashing capability allows our algorithm to circumvent our impossibility result affecting traditional distributed assumptions and techniques: we use process self-crashing to make sure that the view of correct processes is consistent between the error/failure detection mechanisms and our broadcast algorithm. RT-ByzCast can affect which processes are correct and which are not can revive processes that have self-crashed themselves.
Our RT-ByzCast algorithm relies on quorums. The reader might wonder that our principle, albeit safe, may lead the system to a complete shutdown, by having "too many" processes crash themselves. To this end, we perform a thorough simulation of the probability of a process crashing itself in our RT-ByzCast algorithm. We demonstrate that even for high loss rates (60 percent loss rate), the probability that a process crashes itself in RT-ByzCast is negligible for systems with more than 5 processes. We show as well that as the system size increases, the probability of a process crashing itself becomes asymptotic to 0 for any loss rate; hence the system liveness is almost always guaranteed. This matches the typical applications of the target CPS systems we envisage, e.g., the smart grid, where computing sensing and communication devices are deployed in large scale. Moreover, we devise a method that allows systems using our algorithm to tolerate any number of correct processes crashing themselves without shutting down. Our method is based on a scheme for detecting correct processes that crash themselves and over provisioning the number of processes (replicas) used.
Another concern of the reader might arise regarding the expected performance of our algorithm. We show that RT-ByzCast can meet the timing constraints of a large class of typical CPS applications, mainly in SCADA and IoT areas: power system automation and substation automation applications (time constants 100 ms); slow speed auto-control functions ( 500 ms); continuous control applications ( 1 s); or (iii) operator commands of SCADA applications ( 2 s).
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) Theoretical proofs showing that when processes and links can fail, it is impossible to implement RTBRB under traditional distributed computing paradigms that consider processes' correctness checks as oblivious of the broadcast algorithm. We prove that the impossibility holds even when the identity of all faulty and unresponsive processes is known. 2) RT-ByzCast, an algorithm that implements the RTBRB abstraction by aggregating and diffusing digital signatures in a sliding time-window to mask individual communication losses. When messages cannot be masked in time, RT-ByzCast forces processes experiencing those losses to crash themselves. 3) A thorough simulation of the reliability and availability of our RT-ByzCast algorithm under many communication loss rates and system sizes. 4) A performance evaluation showing RT-ByzCast's latency and network overhead. 5) Ways to adapt RT-ByzCast to handle churn. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the system model. Section 3 defines the real-time Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction. Section 4 studies the feasibility of implementing RTBRB under traditional distributed computing assumptions. Section 5 presents the intuitions and details of our RT-ByzCast algorithm. Section 6 demonstrates the reliability nad performance of our RT-ByzCast algorithm by (i) evaluating the probability of a process crashing itself, (ii) computing the probability that the system shuts down, (iii) showing how to allow a system to tolerate the crash ofcorrect processes without causing system shutdown, and (iv) showing the broadcast delivery latency under different system sizes and message loss rates. Section 5.3 discusses how to revive self-crashed processes. Section 5.4 illustrates and details how our RT-ByzCast algorithm can be adapted to handle dynamic systems. Section 7 discusses RT-ByzCast application domains and systems. Finally Sections 8 and 9 discuss existing related work and conclude the paper respectively. For presentation purposes, we defer proofs and additional evaluations to a companion dedicated appendix, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi. ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2018.2871443.
SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
2.1 System Model a) Processes. We consider a distributed system consisting of a set of n > 1 processes, denoted by P ¼ fp 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p n g. Processes are synchronous, i.e., the delay for performing a local step has a fixed known bound, assumed to be negligible compared to communication delays.
Processes have access to local clocks. For presentation simplicity, we assume that these clocks are synchronized, with a bounded skew. Using these clocks, processes define synchronous rounds of the same fixed duration (timetriggered). Rounds are synchronized among all processes, i.e., the start and end of a round occur at all hosts at the same time (with a bounded skew). For a particular round, clocks can trigger an initialization signal at all processes, upon which processes are awakened and initialized as part of the system. b) Communication. Every pair of processes is connected by two logical uni-directional links. Precisely, processes p i and p j are connected by links l ij and l ji . Links can abstract a physical bus or a dedicated network link/path.
We assume that links are reliable and within the maximum delay with high probability. This means that in any transmission attempt, where a message is sent over a link, there is a high probability that the message reaches its destination within a maximum delay d after being transmitted. However, there is a small probability that reliability and timeliness are violated. Such violations exist in networks, as arguably all communication is prone to random disturbances, e.g., bad channel quality, interference, collisions, and buffer overflows [4] .
We consider both message losses and delays as omissions. That is, late messages (violating the d delay assumption) are simply dropped (ignored). This way we treat timing faults [21] as omissions. We define the duration of any synchronous round to be d, the upper bound on a reliable and timely transmission. As such, any message sent at the beginning of round r, if not omitted, is assumed to be received by the end of round r. We consider that processes always send their messages at the beginning of a round. In our model, it is sufficient that delay d is only known by the local clocks that define rounds and not processes. Processes in some round r consider late any received message with a round number < r.
Threat Model
a) Clocks. We assume that the local synchronized clocks of non-Byzantine nodes are secure and hence cannot be attacked. Previous work showed that such secure and synchronized clocks can be built in similar environments using trusted components [22] or GPS [23] . b) Processes. We assume that some processes can exhibit arbitrary, a.k.a. Byzantine, behavior. Byzantine nodes can abstract processes that have been compromised by attackers, or are executing the algorithm incorrectly, e.g., as a result of some fault (software or hardware). A Byzantine process can behave arbitrarily, e.g., it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, delay messages, send arbitrary messages, etc.
We recall that in every transmission attempt a link may (with some probability) violate reliability and timeliness by dropping the message or delivering it within a delay > d. In both cases (dropped and delayed), that message is omitted; hence a sender needs to re-transmit that message again and face yet another risk of transmission failure. Due to omissions (losses and delays in consecutive transmission attempts) and the required follow-up re-transmissions, the time it takes to send a message reliably from one process to another (measured from the time of the first transmission attempt) may be unbounded. So, despite links being reliable and timely with high probability, our communication system is no longer synchronous. Our system (not being synchronous) can tolerate at maximum f ¼ b nÀ1
3 c Byzantine processes. Such an f is proved to be the maximum number of Byzantine processes that an asynchronous system with n processes can tolerate to implement any form of agreement [17] , [24] . f is known to the processes.
A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is termed faulty. Otherwise the process does not deviate from the specification of the algorithm and is said to be non-Byzantine. If the algorithm specifies some non-Byzantine processes to crash themselves within the algorithm's execution, then such crashed processes are termed faulty as well (excluded by the algorithm). The rest of the processes (the non-faulty ones) are termed as correct. More formally, consider an algorithm A that begins execution at some global time t for a period DT . Definition 1. All non-Byzantine processes that do not crash themselves, in ½t; t þ DT are correct wr.t. A. All other processes (Byzantine and non-Byzantine that crashed themselves) are faulty. c) Communication. Links are assumed to be faithful and authenticated, i.e., a link does not alter the content of messages. Hence, Byzantine processes cannot modify messages sent on a link connecting correct processes. Recall however, that links can, with a small probability, violate reliability and timeliness. A message transmitted on link l ij , 8i 6 ¼ j, at any time t has probability 0 < 1 < P o ij ðtÞ < 2 << 1 of getting lost or delayed.
In practice, losses and delays can be correlated and may usually come in bursts, i.e., periods where messages are consecutively lost/delayed. Burst lengths can be well anticipated (with high coverage). 1 Accordingly, we denote by k the maximum burst lengths (in rounds) that are expected to be observed in our network (a.k.a. omission degree). Note that this does not mean the bursts of length > k rounds will not occur, it rather indicates that they seldom do and the system should still account for them. Namely, a link l ij , 8i 6 ¼ j, at any time t has probability P k ij ðtÞ of experiencing bursts of length k. P k ij ðtÞ is essentially a function of P o ij ðtÞ, i.e., P k ij ðtÞ ¼ FðP o ij ðtÞÞ.
REAL-TIME BYZANTINE RELIABLE BROADCAST
We now define the properties of the real-time Byzantine reliable broadcast. Roughly speaking, RTBRB is a communication primitive that allows information to be disseminated reliably and timely in a one-to-all manner. For simplicity, we provide the definition of RTBRB as an abstraction that allows at most one message to be delivered/broadcast. This definition can be easily extended to allow processes to broadcast multiple messages, e.g., see [15] , [18] that resolve this using message identifiers. 1) RTBRB-Validity: If a correct process broadcasts m, then some correct process eventually delivers m. 2) RTBRB-No duplication: No correct process delivers message m more than once. 3) RTBRB-Integrity: If some correct process delivers a message m with sender p i and process p i is correct, then m was previously broadcast by p i . 4) RTBRB-Agreement: If some correct process delivers message m, then every correct process eventually delivers m. 5) RTBRB-Timeliness: There exists a known D such that if a correct process broadcasts m at real-time t, no correct process delivers m after real time t þ D. RTBRB provides processes with two operations, namely RTBRB-broadcast() and RTBRB-deliver(). A process broadcasts a message by invoking RTBRB-broadcast(). Similarly, a process delivers a message by invoking RTBRB-deliver().
We next compare RTBRB properties to those of existing broadcast abstractions, highlighting the differences.
RTBRB Versus Existing Broadcast Primitives 1. For example, in control systems, it is very unlikely that a network link has more than two consecutive message losses. We refer readers to studies like [10] , [25] that elaborate on how to estimate link burstiness. a) Byzantine Reliable Broadcast. An asynchronous Byzantine reliable broadcast [13] , [14] guarantees only a subset of the properties of RTBRB (all except RTBRB-Timeliness). In this sense, as opposed to asynchronous Byzantine reliable broadcast which delivers messages only eventually (i.e., with no predictability measures) our RTBRB primitive provides a timeliness bound: a message sent by correct processes is delivered within a known fixed duration after being broadcast. b) Real-Time Reliable Broadcast. Synchronous (or real-time) reliable broadcasts [10] , [26] provide known fixed bounds on delivering broadcast messages. However they only handle fail-silent process failures and hence cannot tolerate maliciousness. c) Atomic Broadcast. Unlike liveness in the context of (asynchronous) reliable broadcast, the RTBRB-Timeliness property (a safety property) introduces a scent of (physical) ordering, since it stipulates, for each execution, a termination event to occur "at or before" some D on the time-line. This said, one may wonder to what extent does this go into reaching a linear ordering, and thus in the direction of atomic broadcast. In RTBRB, the interleaving of broadcasts from multiple senders, namely when multiple broadcasts are issued in a period shorter than D À d, might result in messages delivered to different processes in a different order. RTBRB-Timeliness ensures that if a message m is delivered, it is delivered at some time in ½d; D after the broadcast.
FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING RTBRB
We now study the feasibility of implementing RTBRB using traditional distributed systems assumptions and techniques.
RTBRB Using Failure Detectors
Traditionally, algorithms are designed to guarantee properties without affecting the correctness of processes. However, algorithms may rely on components, e.g., failure detectors (FDs) [27] , which are external software blocks that provide hints about which processes are faulty. Failure detectors encapsulate synchrony assumptions. Thus, when added to systems with timing uncertainties (i.e., asynchronous), failure detectors make it possible to devise modular algorithms that solve, despite network uncertainties, difficult distributed computing problems, e.g., consensus [28] .
In this section, we prove impossibility results showing that RTBRB cannot be implemented using traditional modular schemes relying on external software blocks, even when these blocks are the "most powerful" ones, such as perfect crash failure detectors, e.g., [27] . These impossibilities indicate that monitoring untimely processes in systems supported by realtime broadcast networks with timing uncertainties (timing and omission faults), should be done within the algorithm implementing RTBRB rather than externally. In short this means going against the modular failure detectors trend initiated with [27] and being more in line with the model of [26] , hence featuring failure detectors and membership integrated with the broadcast protocol.
We give the intuition of why this is surprisingly so, and present proofs of the results. In this sense, we help establish, in this section, a clear understanding of the design constraints that should be followed/avoided when devising algorithms for distributed real-time systems exhibiting timing uncertainties, before delving into the system design. We first define a few essential terms.
Definition 2. A component is oblivious of an algorithm A if
that component does not adapt its behavior to the decisions and actions of A. Such a component does not take any input from A and hence any changes to A result in no impact on the behavior of that component. Moreover, messages relative to that component are assumed to be independent of A's messages (i.e., messages are sent separately over the network).
Definition 3. A Perfect Crash Failure Detector (P) [27] guarantees: 1) Strong completeness: Eventually every faulty process is permanently suspected by all correct processes. 2) Strong accuracy: A correct process is never suspected. The proof relies on the fact that even when knowing the identity of all correct processes, some correct processes might not be reachable in real-time (any predefined duration) through the network (due to probabilistic message losses). Traditional failure detectors [27] seek eventual reachability, while we seek real-time reachability. In other words, such an impossibility does not exist in time-free systems (a.k.a. asynchronous) but merely in those systems requiring a timeliness property. The reason follows from the fact that in time-free asynchronous systems, all correct processes are eventually reachable, even with our notion of links. Reachability changes from being a liveness property (eventual reachability) in timefree systems to being a safety property (timed reachability) in a real-time context. The detailed proof of Theorem 1 is subsumed by the proof of the more general result of Theorem 2.
We investigate next the feasibility of implementing RTBRB when failure detectors can detect, not only crashed processes, but also those processes that are not reachable in time. Perhaps surprisingly, we prove below that the impossibility still persists, if the failure detector remains oblivious of the algorithm implementing RTBRB.
RTBRB Using Proactive Reachability Failure Detectors
In order to determine which processes are alive and reachable in real-time distributed systems, a widely common practice is to use failure detectors that rely on heartbeats with a concrete timeliness specification [25] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] .
Definition 4. Consider some fixed interval of l rounds denoted by D l . Process p i is said to be timely reachable at round r 0 , if for all other correct processes p j in the system, p j has received some message from p i within the past D l interval from r 0 . Conversely, a process p i is unreachable, if p i is not timely reachable at some round by at least one other correct process.
Definition 5. A Proactive Reachability Failure Detector (PR) guarantees the following properties: 1) Strong timed completeness: Every unreachable process is permanently suspected by all correct processes, at most D m rounds after becoming unreachable. 2) Strong timed accuracy: No correct process that is timely reachable is suspected before crashing or becoming unreachable.
Note that the notion of reachability subsumes the notion of crashed (faulty). It is also important to observe that the notion of reachability in Definition 4 is the one that restricts the set of correct and reachable processes the most: the set of processes termed as unreachable is largest under Definition 4. In this sense, impossibilities proven with PR using our definition of reachability are the strongest.
An example of a PR implementation in our system is one that: (1) relies on timeouts (e.g., expiring every D l rounds) and periodic message (heartbeat) exchange between processes, (2) defines timeouts on process p i as a multiple of the period at which p i sends heartbeats, and (3) "suspects" a process p i only when some correct process cannot receive, within the specified timeouts, (direct or indirect) heartbeats sent by p i . Roughly speaking, the proof hinges on two main ideas:
1) The reachability uncovered by PR has a different time-window than that of A. Namely, suspected processes (by PR) are processes that are not reachable up to the current moment, while A would need to see the reachability from the current moment onward. 2) In the same network, due to probabilistic violations of reliability and timeliness, different oblivious applications (which send messages independently of each other) can reach different processes given specific time-constraints. Hence, processes considered to be reachable from PR's perspective might not be reachable in time by the broadcast algorithm. The detailed proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material. Corollary 1. Detecting unreachable processes using a failure detector is not sufficient to allow the implementation of the RTBRB abstraction if that failure detector is oblivious of the algorithm implementing RTBRB.
In short, in order to implement RTBRB in a probabilistically synchronous network, we need to (1) integrate the proactive reachability failure detector within the protocol implementing RTBRB and (2) allow this compound to decide which processes are reachable within the hard timing constraints. In other words, in order to implement RTBRB, the reachability from the perspective of the algorithm implementing RTBRB should be reconciled with that of PR. We accordingly propose in what follows a solution that implements RTBRB by embedding the PR functionality in the RTBRB protocol.
AN ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTING RTBRB
In this section, we propose an algorithm, which we call RT-ByzCast that implements the RTBRB abstraction by avoiding the traditional design pitfalls highlighted in Section 4. RT-ByzCast relies on three main things: processes monitoring each other, message diffusion and signature aggregation over a time-window, and processes capable of crashing themselves. We present the intuition behind each. a) Process Monitoring. Processes do not know beforehand when a broadcast might be invoked. In our system, omissions on any link may be of unbounded durations (even if with a small probability). Thus, there might exist a correct process p that stays unaware of a broadcast invoked by process q: p may lose for an unbounded amount of time messages relative q's broadcast.
In order to provide any form of real-time guarantee, it is crucial to detect the occurrence of such timing violations and react to them. We develop the proof-of-life function (Function 1), which requires processes to periodically exchange heartbeats (and echo received ones) when they do not know of any broadcast. A process p that does not hear enough echoes of its own heartbeats can thus suspect that it either has lost communication with many other processes or that it does not know about an invoked broadcast. b) Message Diffusion and Signature Aggregation. In our system, messages can be omitted, hence re-transmissions are needed to guarantee successful delivery. A digital signature of process p on some message m constitutes an unforgeable proof that p processed m, is aware of it, and has sent (relayed) m. Our algorithm requires processes to aggregate, over some pre-defined time-window, the different observed signatures on a received broadcast message (including their own signature). This way a process receiving a message m can know (from m's aggregated signature) the identity of processes that have received m (within the pre-defined time-window). Besides aggregation our algorithm requires processes to diffuse a received message m (along with its aggregated signature) by re-transmitting m within the predefined time-window multiple times and to other processes. This diffusion helps mask network omissions by exploiting multiple network paths, e.g., relaying information via intermediate processes.
In fact, our time-window creates a slack period of "collective re-transmissions" in which, even if a message is omitted a few times, it still has a high chance (as shown in Section 6) of being successfully received by the end of that time-window (which can be viewed now as the new deadline). We denote by R the duration of that time-window (in rounds). R is a parameter of our algorithm (known to processes) and represents the delay we tolerate for a roundtrip message delay. The larger the value of R, the bigger the slack period, but the higher the chances of a message being received in that duration (see Section 6) . In this sense, R ¼ fðkÞ, meaning that R is a function of k (the anticipated omission degree), R ! 2k þ 2 to account for a round-trip bound. c) Self-Crash Capabilities. A message sent by a non-Byzantine process p might still fail to reach "enough" processes, despite diffusion and aggregation within a time-window of duration R (assumptions on omission degree, despite their high coverage, might be violated). In that case, our algorithm triggers p to crash itself (we formally define when a process crashes itself in Definition 7) . A non-Byzantine process p that "crashes itself" is no longer correct with respect to the algorithm's correctness properties.
Function 1. proof-of-life(D r )@ Process p j 1: for every round r do 2: Send HB(fp j ; rg; s p j ) to all p 2 P 3: end for 4: upon event < receive HB(fp i ; rg; sigs) at some round r 0 > do 5: // sigs designates the signatures on fp i ; rg.
6:
Verify message validity (verify signatures and if msg is well-formed) 7: Set sigs ¼ sigs S s p j 8: for every round in ½r 0 þ 1; r þ D r do 9:
Send HB(fp i ; rg; sigs) to all p 2 P 10: end for 11: 12: for every round r where r > time w do 13: Compute R HB ðp j ; rÞ 14: // R HB ðp j ; rÞ:set of processes that received some heartbeat from p j (directly or indirectly), during some round in ½r À 1 À D r ; r À 1 15: if jR HB ðp j ; rÞj 2f then 16:
Transition to Dead-State 17: end if 18: end for
RT-ByzCast Overview
We present now a high-level view of how our algorithm works in systems where n ¼ 3f þ 1 processes. Every process that did not receive any message relative to a broadcast, executes the proof-of-life function (Function 1), where a process periodically sends a signed heartbeat message to all other processes. When process p j receives p i 's heartbeat at round r, p j : (i) aggregates signatures relative to p i 's heartbeats (signatures of heartbeats sent by p i in ½r; r À R), (ii) appends its own signature to the formed aggregate, and (iii) periodically echoes p i 's heartbeat, with the aggregated signatures, to all other processes (see Fig. 1 ). A process p executing the proof-of-life crashes itself when p does not receive in any time-window of duration R, 2f þ 1 signatures on its own heartbeats (including its own signature).
Behavior of Processes Knowledgeable of a Broadcast
In this case, a process echoes periodically the broadcasted value, only if that value is indeed sent by the process that originally issued the broadcast. If multiple values are heard relative to a single process, the first heard value is the one to be echoed. Processes continue to execute the proof-of-life function, however, piggybacking proof-of-life messages to the echo messages of the broadcast. Similar to the proof-of-life function, processes aggregate and append signatures relative to a given broadcast value in a window of R rounds (from the current round). Upon receiving a value that is signed by more than 2f processes, a process delivers that value. A process that does not receive more than 2f signatures in a R timewindow after being aware of the broadcast crashes itself (see Definition 7) . 
RT-ByzCast Latency
Our RT-ByzCast algorithm delivers messages within an upper bound of 3R rounds. The following example briefly highlights the intuition behind requiring 3R (the detailed proof can be found in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material. Assume a correct process issues a broadcast at round r. By round r þ R, at least 2f other processes would have seen that broadcast (otherwise the broadcasting process kills itself). In the worst case, those processes would see the broadcast at round r þ R À 1. Assume that the remaining f processes in the system have not yet received the broadcast message. By round r þ 2R these f processes should have heard about the broadcast or otherwise they would kill themselves (processes that already received the broadcast send heartbeats only via echo messages relative to the broadcast). After receiving the broadcast, these f processes have an additional R rounds to collect enough signatures and hence will deliver the broadcast message at worst by r þ 3R. Send periodically starting from the current round RTBRB-broadcast(ðp i ; r; vÞ; s p i ) to all p 2 P 7: @ any round r > r 0 : 8: Initialize R p i echo ðp j ; r; vÞ ¼ ;; 9:
upon event < receive RTBRB-broadcast (ðp j ; r 0 ; vÞ; s p j ) for the first time > do 10:
Execute proof-of-life function in piggyback mode 11:
Set R echo ðp j ; r; vÞ ¼ p i ; 12:
Send Echo p i (ðp j ; r 0 ; v; s p j Þ; s p i ) to all p 2 P at rounds ! r 13: 14: upon event < receive Echo p k (ðp j ; r 0 ; v; s p j Þ; S) do 15:
// S being a set of signatures 16:
Set sigs = aggregate-sig p i (v; p j ; S; p k ) 17:
if (p i did not deliver v)^(p i is not sending any Echo ()) then 18:
Execute proof-of-life function in piggyback mode.
19:
if sigs 2f then 20:
Send at the beginning of every cycle (as of round
Set R echo ðp j ; r; vÞ ¼ sigs 23:
Execute deliver-message(p j ; v; sigs) 24:
end if 25:
end if 26:
if p i is sending an Echo p i (ðp j ; r 0 ; v; s p j Þ; . . .) then 27:
Set R echo ðp i ; r; vÞ ¼ sigs 28:
if sigs > 2f (for the first time) then 29:
Execute deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs).
30:
end if 31:
if sigs 2f then 32:
Send at the beginning of every cycle (as of round r þ 1 onward) Echo p k (ðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; sigs) to all p 2 P 33:
if sigs > 2f (for the first time) then 37:
Set R echo ðp i ; r; vÞ ¼ sigs 38:
Execute deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs) 39:
end if 40:
end if 41: 42:
upon event < receive Deliver p k (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; S) at round r > do 43:
if ððp i ; vÞ is not delivered yet then 44:
Deliver v 45:
Stop sending any Echo() 46:
Set R deliver ðp i ; rÞ ¼ S fp k g, 8p k : s p k 2 S 47:
50:
Send Deliver p j (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; signatures) to all p 2 P at every round in ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ 2R, signatures contains the signatures of all processes in R deliver ðp i ; . . .Þ.
51:
Execute same commands as lines 5-8 of delivermessage p j (. . .) 52:
Description of RT-ByzCast
We now describe our algorithm formally and in more details. Using our RT-ByzCast algorithm, non-Byzantine processes can be in one of two states: the Alive-State or the Dead-State. Non-Byzantine processes in the Alive-State follow the algorithm faithfully. Processes in the Dead-State, however, refrain from sending any messages and do not respond to any higher-level application requests. A process in the Dead-State appears to have crashed as in fail-stop failures [16] . For presentation simplicity, we consider that once a process is in the Dead-State, it remains in the Dead-State forever. In Section 5.3, we discuss how processes can be revived, by returning to the Alive-State and participating in the algorithm.
Initially, after receiving an initiation signal from the clock, all processes are awakened and execute in the Alive-State. Every process p i defines a time-window of a known fixed size of R > 1 rounds and Msg½ n ½ n , an initially empty array to store the values broadcast relative to each process, with the corresponding signatures on these values. Msg½ n ½ n is the local data structure that stores relative to each process that issues a broadcast and each process that echoes it, the broadcast values and their aggregated signatures. For example, Msg½p i ½p k stores all messages with aggregated signatures that are broadcast by some process p i and that are echoed by a process p k . After initialization, every process in the Alive-State executes a proof-of-life function with parameter D r ¼ R.
A process p i that executes the proof-of-life function sends a heartbeat HB(fp i ; rg; s p i ) to all processes at the beginning of every round r, where s p i denotes p i 's signature over the heartbeat. A process p j receiving HB(fp i ; rg; sigs) at some round r 0 verifies that the heartbeat has been indeed seen by the processes that signed it (sigs is the set of signatures on fp i ; rg). Then p j appends its signature to sigs and sends HB (fp i ; rg; sigs) to all other processes in all rounds 2 ½r 0 þ 1; r þ D r (lines 7-10). A process p i computes at the beginning of every round r : r > D r the set R HB ðp i ; rÞ, which is the set of distinct processes that were able to receive some heartbeat from p i (directly or indirectly), during some round in ½r À 1 À D r ; r À 1.
Precisely, let us denote by M the set of HB(fp i ; r 00 g; Ã) heartbeats that p i received. Then R HB ðp i ; rÞ contains all processes that have their signature in any heartbeat in M such that round r 00 2 ½r À 1 À D r ; r À 1. For any round after D r rounds elapse since system initialization (i.e., 8 rounds r : r > D r ), if ever jR HB ðp i ; rÞj 2f, then process p i transitions to the Dead-State (lines 12-18).
RT-ByzCast: The Algorithm (Algorithm 4)
After system start-up, every process p i begins by executing the proof-of-life function with D r ¼ R. A process p i that wishes to broadcast a value v at round r À 1 initializes an empty set denoted by R echo ðp i ; r; vÞ. Then p i signs ðp i ; r À 1; vÞ with an unforgeable signature s p i and produces the tuple fðp i ; r À 1; vÞ; s p i g. This tuple is made of two parts: a payload and a signed-by part. For example, the tuple fðp i ; r À 1; vÞ; s p i g has ðp i ; r À 1; vÞ as payload and s p i as the signed-by. Afterwards process p i sends at the beginning of round r À 1, the message RTBRB-broadcast(ðp i ; r À 1; vÞ; s p i ) to all processes. When a process p j (that is executing the proof-of-life function) first receives an RTBRB-broadcast(ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞ; s p i ) message in round r ! r 0 from p i , process p j initializes an empty set denoted by R p j echo ðp i ; r þ 1; v; s p i Þ. Afterwards p j retrieves the tuple fðp i ; r 0 ; vÞ; s p i g, verifies that p i indeed sent v, and produces the tuple fðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; s p j g by appending p j 's signature to the signed-by field.
Process p j starts sending at the beginning of every round (as of round r onward) Echo p j (ðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; s p j ) to all other processes. Process p j continues to execute the proofof-life function however by piggybacking its heartbeats on Echo p j (ðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; s p j ).
When process p j receives a (valid) Echo p k (ðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; S) at some round r , where S ¼ s p x ; . . . ; s p z , p j behaves as follows.
A. If p j is not sending any Echo()(lines 17-25): then if p j has not already delivered a message from p i , p j aggregates signatures in the variable sigs. It does so using the function aggregate-sig p j (. . .) (detailed Function 2) that combines all observed signatures on messages sent by p k containing ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞ. Then if signatures in sigs do not add up to 2f þ 1 processes, p j sends Echo p j (ðp i ; r þ 1; v; s p i Þ; s p j ) and initializes a set (R echo ðp i ; r þ 1; vÞ) that tracks the number of signatures collected on the Echo p j (ðp i ; r þ 1; v; s p i Þ; . . .). Otherwise, i.e., if signatures in sigs amount to at least 2f þ 1 processes, p j sets R echo ðp i ; r; vÞ ¼ sigs and delivers the message by executing deliver-message(v; sigs). Any process p j that executes deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs) delivers message ðp i ; v; sigsÞ and only sends Deliver p j (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; . . .) for 2R rounds. p j should collect a least 2f þ 1 signatures during the first R rounds. This requirement ensures that there is a full R-duration during which at least f þ 1 correct processes are sending only such deliver messages. 2 If no Echo() or RTBRB-broadcast() is being sent/ received, p j executes the proof-of-life function with parameter R (without piggybacking).
B. If p j is sending an Echo p j (ðp i ; r 0 ; v; s p i Þ; . . .) (lines [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] : In this case, if p j has not delivered a message from p i , p j aggregates signatures in sigs (using the function aggregatesig p j (. . .)). Then p j checks if sigs contains more than 2f signatures, in which case p j sets R echo ðp i ; r; vÞ ¼ sigs and delivers ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞ by executing deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs). Otherwise, i.e., if jsigsj 2f, p j sends echoes of ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞ with the new aggregated signatures, if (k ¼ j).
C. If p j is sending an Echo p j (ðp i ; r 00 ; v 0 ; s p i Þ; Ã) where v 0 6 ¼ v: p j aggregates signatures in sigs (using the function aggregate-sig p j (v; p i ; S; s p k )). Then p j checks if sigs contains more than 2f signatures, in which case p j delivers ðp i ; r 00 ; vÞ by executing deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs).
If p j receives Deliver p k (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; s px . . . s pz ) for the first time at round r (lines 49-58), p j delivers ðp i ; v; sigsÞ by executing deliver-message(p i ; v; sigs). If p j has previously seen such a Deliver() message, p j aggregates in the variable signatures all the signatures it has on Deliver p j (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; . . .) messages. Then p j sends Deliver p j (ðp i ; v; sigsÞ; signatures) at the beginning of every round 2 ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ 2R.
At the beginning of round r þ 2 þ 2R, if p j is not sending any Echo() or RTBRB-broadcast(), then p j executes the proof-of-life function with parameter R (without piggybacking). Definition 6. Any RTBRB-broadcast(p i ; . . .) or Echo (p i ; . . .) message is termed invalid when it possesses any incorrect signature. Any Deliver(ðp i ; . . . ; sigsÞ . . .) is termed invalid when it possesses any incorrect signature, or when sigs has less than 2f þ 1 correct signatures. If a process receives invalid messages, it ignores them. 1) 9r 0 r À R : 0 < jR echo ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞj 2f; 8v 2) If p j has not discovered a lie. A process p j is said to "discover a lie", if p j can verify that two different values have been sent by the process issuing the broadcast. We give now a brief intuition behind each of the four cases. In Case 1, the first condition ensures that processes, which cannot communicate with a Byzantine quorum, crash themselves. The second condition avoids the denial of service attack that a Byzantine process can launch. For Case 2 and Case 3, consider a setting where a correct process p aggregates 2f þ 1 signatures, delivers a message and directly loses communication with other processes. Now assume that other processes detect that the broadcasting process is lying. These other processes do not kill themselves (by Case 1). If p stays alive this would violate agreement. Case 2 eliminates this violation. Case 3 eliminates a violation in agreement when the processes that detect a lie are fewer than f þ 1 and get disconnected temporarily from the other correct processes that deliver some v. Case 4 makes sure that any process whose messages are not seen by (at least) 2f þ 1 processes in any duration of value R crashes itself. This case 4 is used to allow the detection of processes that crash themselves (see Section 6.3.1).
We present in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material, the proof that RT-ByzCast implements the RTBRB abstraction.
Reviving Processes in the Dead-State
In order to allow processes to leave the Dead-State, we propose a modification to our RT-ByzCast algorithm. A process p i that issues a broadcast at some round r sends now RTBRBbroadcast(p i ; r; v; s p i ) instead of RTBRB-broadcast (p i ; v; s p i ). In other words, p i includes the round in which the broadcast is issued (first sent) in the payload of the RTBRBbroadcast() message that p i sends. The behavior of our RT-ByzCast algorithm of Section 5.2 remains the same.
A process in the Dead-State mimics the behavior of a crashed process in the fail-stop model [16] . However, unlike an actual crashed process, a process p i in the Dead-State continues to listen and process received messages. In other words, a process p j that is in the Dead-State executes our RT-ByzCast algorithm, however with the exception that p j refrains from sending any message. If process p j (in the Dead-State) detects that some value v relative to process p i has been signed by at least 2f þ 1 processes (i.e., jR echo ðp i ; r 0 ; vÞj > 2f), then p j performs a check: if the current round, r, satisfies r À 2R > r 0 , where r 0 is the round in which v was issued, then p j delivers the message v (if it has not done so), shifts to the Alive-State. Then p j transmits during every round in ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ R the message Deliver(ðp i ; r 0 ; v; sigsÞ; Ã) and resumes as in Section 5.2.
The Case of a Dynamic System
So far in the paper, we have discussed systems where the maximum number of processes n is static and known to all processes. In this section, we consider a dynamic system where the maximum number of processes in the system is unknown, as processes can randomly join and leave. This adjustment to allow our algorithm to handle dynamicity preserves the correctness of RT-ByzCast, as we ensure that the total number of nodes, which are part of the system, is known to everyone. For consistency, as the system now allows processes to join at any point in time, we assume the following: a process that transitions to the Alive-State at round r is not required to deliver any messages that were broadcast at rounds <r.
We consider that correct processes now can exist, at any point in time, in one of three possible states: Alive-State, Dead-State, and Pending-State. Only those processes that exist in the Alive-State are the ones that should guarantee the RTBRB properties. We assume that initially x > 3 processes exist and are awakened by the clock initialization signal. We assume that these processes constitute a trusted pool and that their identity is known to any process that wishes to join the system later. Some processes within the trusted pool, at most b xÀ1 3 c, can be Byzantine. Our trusted pool can be viewed as a trusted authority, which is a widely adopted assumption in Byzantine group communication protocols [33] , [34] . In fact, in the absence of a centralized admission control scheme, a trusted entity becomes a necessity for allowing joins in an intrusion-tolerant system [35] . Processes in the trusted pool constitute the initial system and execute our RT-ByzCast algorithm.
Hence, the total number of processes, n, is initially equal to x (n however is not fixed). n is the number of processes that exist in either the Alive-State or the Dead-State. We consider that at any point in time at most f ¼ b nÀ1 3 c can be Byzantine.
We assume that every process maintains a list ID that contains the ids of the processes in the system. Initially the ID list contains the ids of all processes in the trusted pool. A process p j that wants to join the system at round r, initializes its state to the Pending-State, sets n ¼ x, and defines ID as the list of ids of all processes in trusted pool. p j begins to send at the beginning of every round in ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ R the heartbeat message, HB(fp j ; key j ; rg; s p j ), to the processes in the trusted pool. Upon the receipt of a HB(fp j ; key j ; rg; s p j ) in round r 0 : r 0 2 ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ R a process p i in the trusted pool executes the following, if p i is not sending some message for another potential joining process. p i verifies the received heartbeat. Then p i creates a Join (fp j ; key j ; rgfn; IDg; s p j ; s p i ) message and sends this message in rounds r 00 : r 00 2 ½r 0 þ 1; r þ 1 þ R it to all processes in the trusted pool, and to p j as well.
If a process p k in the trusted pool receives Join(fp j ; key j ; rgfn; IDg; s p j ; . . . ; s p i ) at some round r 0 : r 0 2 ½r þ 1; r þ 1 þ R, p k verifies the message received and validates that the values of n and ID match with its local values. Then, considering that SIGðp k Þ, contains the signatures that p k received so far relative to fp j ; key j ; rgfn; IDg (p k 's signature is included in SIGðp k Þ), process p k executes SIGðp k Þ ¼ SIGðp k Þ S fs p j ; . . . ; s p i g. If SIGðp k Þ contains signatures from at least b xÀ1 3 c þ 1 processes, then p k sends in rounds r 00 : r 00 2 ½r 0 þ 1; r þ 1 þ R Join(fp j ; key j ; rgfn; IDg; SIGðp k Þ) to all processes in the trusted group and to p j as well.
The joining process p j also executes the same steps when receiving Join(fp j ; key j ; rgfn; IDg; s p j ; . . . ; s p i ) messages. If at some round r 0 r þ 1 þ R, SIGðp j Þ relative to some ðn; IDÞ contains signatures from at least 2b xÀ1 3 c þ 1 processes in the trusted pool, p j transitions to the Alive-State, updates its parameters accordingly (to be equivalent to the new values of n þ 1 and ID S p j ), and invokes an RTBRBbroadcast(join ðp j ; key j Þ;s p j ). Otherwise, i.e., if p j fails to collect enough signatures on some values of n and ID by round r þ 1 þ R, then p j remains in the Pending-State, quits sending any messages, and tries to join the system again after a random duration elapses.
All processes that take part of the RTBRB-broadcast (join ðp j ; key j Þ;s p j ) do not count p j 's signature as part of any quorum (but simply use it for verifying the validity of the message sent). Any process that RTBRB-delivers (join ðp j ; key j Þ;*), except p j , updates the set of public keys to include key j and the local parameters to n ¼ n þ 1 and f ¼ b nÀ1 3 c, ID S p j . That concludes the joining procedure for processes. A process p l that wants to leave the system, issues an RTBRB-broadcast(leave ðp l ; key l Þ;s p l ). p l remains in the Alive-State until p l delivers the message relative to its leave request broadcast, after which p l shifts to the Dead-State. If it wishes, p l can join the system later.
EVALUATION
We now present an analytic performance study of RT-ByzCast. We evaluate first the probability of having a correct process in RT-ByzCast, enter the Dead-State, i.e., crash itself.
Probability of a Correct Process Shutdown
The probability of a correct process crashing itself is crucial, as it may hinder the reliability of the whole system, namely the system's liveness. For instance, in systems where n ¼ 3f þ 1 (which are a subset of systems with f < n 3 ), having a single correct process crash itself can result in a cascade of self-induced crashes leading the whole system to shutdown. This cascade is caused by the fact that one correct process crashing itself may prevent correct processes ever gathering the required 2f þ 1 quorum, e.g., if in the worst case all f processes are Byzantine in addition to the correct process that crashed itself.
In our simulation setting, we first assume that all messages can be lost/omitted independently and with the same probability, i.e., we assume that P o ij ðtÞ ¼ p8t; i 6 ¼ j. In Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material, we study the effect of having correlated losses/omissions that may result in bursts and show that a large enough slack window masks losses/omissions regardless of correlations and preserves drawn conclusions under the independent assumption. We describe the simulation setting in which we perform our evaluation.
Let us denote by C, the minimum set of non-Byzantine processes, i.e, jCj ¼ n À f. We run our simulations for jCj 2 f5; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 100; 200g processes. For each value of jCj, we consider various probability values with which a sent message can be lost/omitted. Namely, we consider the probability of losing/omitting a message sent at any point in time to be p 2 f10 À6 ; 10 À5 ; 10 À4 ; 10 À3 ; 10 À2 ; 10 À1 ; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9g. For a given value of jCj and p, we invoke a broadcast at one of the processes and record, after R rounds of communication, if any process does not receive jCj signatures on the value being broadcast. We repeat such an instance 10 6 times. We report our results showing num: of instances in which some correct process crashes itself 10 6 ;
for R 2 f5; 6; 10; 15g rounds respectively. We select these values of R to show that a well chosen fixed value regardless of system size and loss probability allows our RT-ByzCast algorithm to be reliable. Our results in Figs. 2, 3, 4 , and 5 show that our RT-ByzCast algorithm achieves a higher reliability, i.e., a smaller probability of having a correct process crash itself, as the number of non-Byzantine processes, jCj, increases. This aspect of our algorithm is fundamental to the typical applications of the target CPS systems we envisage, e.g., the smart grid, where computing sensing and communication devices are deployed on a large scale.
Moreover, from a different perspective, namely by fixing jCj and varying the window size (R), we show in Appendix D, available in the online supplemental material, that increasing the number of communication rounds (i.e., the value of R) increases the reliability of our RT-ByzCast algorithm for any number of correct processes. In fact, with R ¼ 10 the probability of a process crashing itself becomes negligible even with up to 60 percent losses/omissions rate.
Tolerating a Correct Process Self-Crash
Despite the small probability of having a process crash itself, we provide in this section a means to allow the system using RT-ByzCast to tolerate processes self-crashing while still being available. Let us respectively denote by Probðp shutd Þ and Probðsys shutd Þ the probability that a process kills itself and the probability that the whole system shuts down. A system where n ¼ 3f þ 1 shuts down, in the worst-case, as soon as a single process crashes itself. Hence, an upper bound on the probability that the whole system shuts down can be formally expressed by
(1) Fig. 2 . The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system after 10 communication rounds (R ¼ 5). A system using our RT-ByzCast algorithm can be made more reliable while tolerating the maximum number of Byzantine processes. Precisely, we can allow the system to tolerate a single correct process crashing itself, after which any additional correct processes that crashes itself would trigger the whole system to shutdown. To do so, for any desired value of f, the maximum number of tolerable Byzantine processes, we choose the total number of processes to be n ¼ 3f þ 3: Note that selecting n as such means that the Byzantine quorum now becomes of size 2f þ 2 rather than 2f þ 1. Correct processes can gather such a quorum even if one correct process crashes itself and all f processes are Byzantine.
With this optimization, the probability that whole system shuts down takes a new value, which is expressed by
k¼0 n À f k ðProbðp shutd ÞÞ k ð1 À Probðp shutd ÞÞ nÀfÀk :
(2) From Fig. 4 , a correct process crashes itself with a probability < 10 6 in systems using more than 5 correct processes, R ¼ 10 rounds, and experiencing network omission rate of up to 60 percent. Accordingly, we perform a numerical analysis of the probability that the whole system shuts down as expressed in (1), and (2) and we show our results in Fig. 6 .
The graphs of Fig. 6 highlight the increase in reliability between the two system design choices showing that a system implementing RT-ByzCast operates with a very high reliability (negligible probability of system shutdown).
Enhancing the reliability of the system further, by allowing it to tolerate more correct processes crashing themselves, is possible. However, doing so requires the system to have a mechanism of globally detecting aborted processes that crash themselves. We further elaborate on that in what follows.
Tolerating any Number of Processes
Self-Crashing
In this section, we introduce a way that allows us to design, using RT-ByzCast, systems that can tolerate any number of correct processes crashing themselves. The solution is based on two main things: (i) over-provisioning and (ii) self-crash detection. To over-provision in system design, namely means to include additional redundant process replicas. In other words, to tolerate f Byzantine processes and rep simultaneous process self-crashes in the system (8f; rep) we choose the total number of processes, n, to satisfy n ¼ 3f þ rep þ 1: Processes then will execute our RT-ByzCast using Byzantine quorums depending on the value of n, which can only monotonically decrease (due to processes crashing themselves). Designing a system as such means that the system can tolerate up to rep correct processes crashing themselves simultaneously (for any value of rep).
However, in order to support system liveness for up to rep correct processes crashing themselves, the system would need to detect, within R rounds after having crashed, every process that crashed itself. This detection allows other correct processes to update n and the needed quorums, without resulting in a cascade of self crashes leading to system shutdown. To this end, we describe in what follows a mechanism to detect crashed processes within R rounds after crashing.
Detecting a Correct Process in the Dead-State
We recall that when a process p i executes the proof-of-life function as well as when that process issues a broadcast, p i needs to issue a message that should be seen by 2f þ 1 processes within a window of R rounds; otherwise p i would crash itself (case 4 of Section 5.2). In this sense, having any set of 2f þ 1 processes not hearing from p i in a window of R rounds indicates that p i has crashed itself (or is Byzantine). Note that a process p j can hear from p i either directly or via other processes.
The algorithm for detecting process self-crashes (and Byzantine processes mimicking a self-crash behavior) works as follows. Every process now includes in its message the round number during which it has sent the message. Every process p i appends to every message it sends a list L p i of size n, relative to the n processes in the system. L p i contains, for every process p j 2 P, the time-stamp relative to last time that p j sent a message (based on p j 's messages that p i received). Note that a stored time-stamp relative to process p j should have an associated proof of validity, that being the signature of p j on a message holding that time-stamp (invalid timestamps are ignored). Every process merges all the L lists received such that the time-stamp with largest valid value for each process is kept. In every round r : r > R, if a process p i receives 2f þ 1 lists such that the time-stamp relative to some process p j is less than the current round minus R in all received L, then p i does the following: (1) claims p j as crashed, (2) updates n to n À 1 and updates as well the new corresponding Byzantine quorum size, and (3) ignores all messages relative to p j that may arrive at a later time.
Performance of RT-ByzCast
In addition to evaluating the reliability of RT-ByzCast, we evaluate how fast it can deliver messages. In Appendix E, available in the online supplemental material, we also show the incurred cost that RT-ByzCast has on the network bandwidth. RT-ByzCast has a latency of at most 3R to deliver a message to all correct processes. The value of R should be chosen such that process p can know with high probability that at least 2f þ 1 processes received its message m. We simulate the value of R (in communication rounds) by running RT-ByzCast on a commodity laptop with Intel Core i7-6820HQ processor running at 2.70 GHz with 4 threads and 10 GB of RAM. Running RT-ByzCast on a different hardware might result in different values of R, mainly due to the Fig. 6 . The probability of the whole system shutting down, when R ¼ 10, w.r.t. different values of the probability of a correct process crashing itself under 60 percent network loss rates (taken from Fig. 4 ).
computation load of cryptographic operations. Evaluating RT-ByzCast on more varied hardware is outside the scope of this work and is left for future work.
We initially set R ¼ 1 round and run our reliability experiments for 2 Â 10 5 times. We gradually increase the value of R until no node aborts in all 2 Â 10 5 repetitions. In our experiments, we assumed the worst case situation where all "f" nodes are Byzantine and can obstruct our algorithm by not forwarding messages' signatures. Fig. 7 represents the value of R for 10, 50, 100 and 200 nodes, depending on the probability of message loss. First, as one may expect the empirical value of R increases with the probability of message loss. Second, we observe that increasing the system's size decreases the value of R. This may appear unexpected, however, it is due to the fact that nodes forward messages in an all-to-all manner where messages can be probabilistically lost. Therefore, message losses have a lower impact on the broadcast delay in large scale systems. For example, with 90 percent message losses, R is 41 rounds with 10 nodes and 7 rounds with 200 nodes.
To obtain the latency of RT-ByzCast, we empirically evaluate the worst case computational delay (d max ) needed per node per round. This delay includes the time a node needs to process all received messages and prepare the corresponding messages to be sent. Nodes use the ecdsa-256 encryption scheme [36] , which is known for being fast and for having relatively short signatures. The overall worst case latency of RT-ByzCast would then be computed as 3 Â R Â d max . We illustrate this overall latency in Fig. 8 . We observed from our experiments that having more Byzantine nodes in the system puts a higher computing load on correct nodes. The variations in Fig. 8 for a given system size result from two main factors: (i) the value of R increases with message losses (Fig. 7) , and (ii) the value of d max decreases with higher message losses, depending on the maximum number of simultaneously received messages per round. With low loss rates (from 10 À6 to 10 À4 in Fig. 8 ), a slight increase in the value of R increases the broadcast time noticeably. As message losses become more frequent (e.g., from 10 À4 to 0.5) the value of d max decreases, reducing the broadcast delay, until the value of R increases sufficiently to compensate and increase again the broadcast time (e.g., from 0.5 to 0.9).
Our numbers in Fig. 8 show that without any performance optimizations, and despite message losses, RT-ByzCast can meet the timing constraints of various applications, such as (i) power system automation and substation automation applications (IEC 61850-5 standard [37] ), e.g., transfer of automation functions (TT3 class messages) % 100 ms (systems size 50), slow speed auto-control functions, timetagged alarms, event records, set-values read/write operations (TT4 class messages) 500 ms, (ii) continuous control (e.g., temperature-driven) applications 1 s [20] , and (iii) operator commands of SCADA applications ( 2 s) [38] .
However, we believe that RT-ByzCast's latency has a substantial margin for improvement, whose avenues we discuss in the conclusions.
RT-BYZCAST POTENTIAL APPLICATION DOMAINS
The problem we address-disseminating information in a real-time Byzantine-resilient manner given communication synchrony disruptions-is of fundamental importance to any critical distributed system seeking dependability and security in the CPS context. RTBRB is important to, e.g., (1) achieve a real-time common view of the state of the system by independent processes, (2) distribute sensory information in a coherent way or (3) help ensure the consistency of replicas driving a same end-component, e.g., an actuator. The difficulty of the problem lies in ensuring predictability and resilience despite communication uncertainties, faults, and attacks that hinder the synchronism needed to meet real-time deadlines. In this sense, RT-ByzCast showcases an algorithmic design solution to circumvent the impossibilities that prevent traditional modular distributed computing approaches from achieving real-time Byzantineresilient information dissemination. As a well-contained primitive, RT-ByzCast can be integrated in implementations of existing systems and frameworks, for example those related to distributed control systems (DCSs) [39] which include monitoring and control applications for factory automation, substation automation and smart grids. In fact, real-time execution platforms for DCSs, such as FASA [31] , [40] , have architectures that adhere to the assumptions considered in this paper; thus RT-ByzCast can be of substantial use to both the underlying system-monitoring algorithms as well as to the control applications being run (e.g., power control applications [20] ). Other application systems include ship-board DCSs requiring distributed real-time data services [41] , [42] , traffic control and agile manufacturing that require "fresh" data reflecting real-world status [41] , [42] , [43], [44] , and multi-gateway SmartData construct protocols for CPSs on Wireless Sensor Networks or on the Internet of Things [45] .
RELATED WORK
The work in this paper has evolved from both works of Christian et al. [46] and Verissimo et al. [26] , in what concerns the timing/synchrony aspect. Christian et al. assumed that all non-faulty processes remain connected synchronously, regardless of any process and network failures. This strong assumption about the network was too ideal, in terms of scale and timing behaviour. This resulted in a poor performance in practice (latency of % 20 s) limiting the algorithms's application areas. The limited performance is mainly attributed to deterministic network model (which in turn affected the solution design). Moreover, the system model of Christian et al. did not allow processes that malfunction (violates assumptions) to know that they are being treated as faulty by the model. In contrast, RT-ByzCast provides latencies in the range of milliseconds (from few to few hundreds depending on system size and message loss). We achieve this performance gain by forcing processes to operate within the needed delays: we exclude processes that are incapable of meeting the desired timing requirements. Moreover, in our model, processes that violate timeliness assumptions transition to the Dead State and hence are aware of their "non-correctness" (in terms of time). Verissimo et al. [26] , addressed the timeliness problem by what the authors called weak-fail-silence: despite the capability of the transmission medium to deliver messages reliably and in real-time, the protocol should not be agnostic of potential timing or omission faults (even if sporadic). This notion was embedded in a bounded omission specification that weakens the basic fail-silence (crash) hypothesis. In our paper, we make a significant advance, by taking a further step: providing these reliable real-time communication guarantees, in environments with much higher uncertainty levels (faults and attacks). In fact, the bounded omissions assumption of Verissimo et al. [26] could not be taken as is, if we were to tolerate such higher and more uncertain fault sets (as we consider): it could easily lead to system unavailability in faulty periods. The rest of the literature on broadcast primitives, to the best of our knowledge, either does not take into account timeliness and maliciousness or addresses them separately. We next summarize few such related works.
Byzantine Reliable Communication
In order to withstand unpredictable security threats and software unreliability arising within networks, various works have investigated how to provide a reliable broadcast capable of tolerating arbitrary process behavior. A celebrated algorithm in distributed computing is that of Bracha and Toueg [14] , which implements reliable broadcast in an asynchronous system of n processes with at most f < n 3 Byzantine processes (proved to be an upper bound on the number of tolerable Byzantine processes [13] , [14] ). Their broadcast algorithm, similar to the RT-ByzCast, relies on echoing enough messages before delivering a value. Later works tried to further optimize this algorithm, e.g., in terms of the total number of asynchronous communication rounds needed for termination [15] . On a different level Obenshain et al. [47] design and construct an intrusion-tolerant overlay capable of tolerating Byzantine actions, based on the key understanding that no overlay node should be trusted or given preference. The authors use a maximal topology with minimal weights to prevent routing attacks at the overlay level and rely on source routing augmented with redundant dissemination methods to limit the effect of compromised forwarder processes.
Unlike RT-ByzCast, the solutions above [13] , [14] , [15] , [47] do not provide timeliness guarantees on message delivery, even when applied to weakly synchronous networks such as the one we consider in this paper.
Timeliness Communication Guarantees
Given the need for predictable responsiveness in various applications today, many efforts have been made to devise timely broadcast (or routing/communication) algorithms, i.e., communication protocols with known fixed delays.
Timeliness on web communication, for example, has been addressed in content distribution networks [48] , [49] such as Akamai [50] . The concept behind such distribution networks is to place data in a close geographical proximity from its consumers and hence minimize latency. In a slightly different context, timeliness has been also addressed at the level of data center networks [51] , [52] . The proposed solutions in this area mainly advocate modifications of network devices. Bessani et al. propose Jiter [9] , an application-layer routing, as a means to provide message latency and reliability assurances for control traffic in wide-area IP networks. Jiter routes deadline constrained control messages using an overlay network created on top of multi-homed communication infrastructure. Babay et al. [10] present an overlay transport service that can provide highly reliable communication while meeting stringent timeliness guarantees. Their scheme relies on an analysis of real-world network data, upon which they develop timely dissemination graphs and specify targeted redundant transmissions to timeliness and reliability.
Existing efforts have also investigated providing endto-end guarantees in networks. Jacob et al. [2] propose an approach to integrate a wireless real-time communication protocol into CPS. Their approach decouples communication from application tasks. They devise a protocol based on dynamically establishing contracts between source/destination devices and the networking protocol. Another set of protocols known as resource reservation protocols (RSVP) combine flow specification, resource reservation, admission control, and packet scheduling to achieve end-to-end QoS [53] . Relying on software-defined networks, Kumar et al. [54] propose a framework that synthesizes network paths which can meet the requisite delay requirements for real-time flows.
On a different level Guerraoui et al. [20] devise an algorithm that allows processes to communicate in timely fashion via a real-time distributed shared memory (DSM). Using their DSM, write operations of a correct process become consistently visible to all alive processes within a known fixed delay. Their approach relies on bundling data messages with control traffic, namely traffic relative to the failure detector component used for monitoring processes in distributed control systems.
However, all above solutions [2] , [9] , [10] , [20] , [48] , [49] , [50] , [51] , [52] , [53] , [54] , unlike RT-ByzCast, cannot handle malicious process behavior and hence would fail if any process is compromised. This paper studied how to realize the RTBRB abstraction: a real-time Byzantine-resilient reliable broadcast in the presence of unbounded communication losses and delays. We first showed that implementing RTBRB is challenging and in fact is impossible under traditional paradigms that consider failure detection mechanisms working independently of the distributed algorithms. To circumvent it, we proposed RT-ByzCast, an algorithm that deploys temporal and spatial diffusion of messages, and signature aggregation in a sliding time-window to mask losses and track process connectivity. RT-ByzCast bounds network timing uncertainties by reconciling two mechanisms: cooperative roundbased message retransmission involving all processes; and proactive self-crashing of misbehaving processes.
We proved that RT-ByzCast indeed implements the desired RTBRB abstraction and we showed that it does so robustly and efficiently: we evaluated the reliability of our algorithm, showing that it can tolerate quite high loss rates (% 60%) whilst still delivering the real-time service and ensuring a negligible probability that any correct process crashes itself, hence guaranteeing system survivability. We also showed that RT-ByzCast meets the timing constraints expected by a wide range of CPS and IoT applications, whose latency requirements are normally inversely proportional to the system size: RTBRB delays are in the order of the dozens of milliseconds on average, ranging from few milliseconds to hundreds of milliseconds, as system size goes from 10 to 200 nodes. Furthermore, RT-ByzCast design and minimal environment assumptions, simplify its integration in existing architectures.
By providing the first solution to the RTBRB problem in environments where synchrony constraints co-exist with maliciousness, the objective of this paper has been met: discovering and proving impossibility results countering common beliefs about failure detection, which will guide future research in these environments, as well as developing algorithms to circumvent them which, whilst non-optimised, already provide suitable performance for real world CPS/IoT applications.
However, we believe RT-ByzCast's latency has a substantial margin for improvement, to meet more demanding timeliness needs, still in large scale system deployments. We plan to address these optimisations in future work, such as using gossip paradigms to decrease the nodes' transmission costs, and using multisignature/aggregate signature schemes to amortize the costs of signatures.
